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ABSTRACT.  Lewis has recently argued that Maudlin’s contingent absorber experiment remains 
a significant problem for the Transactional Interpretation (TI).  He argues that the only 
straightforward way to resolve the challenge is by describing the absorbers as offer waves, and 
asserts that this is a previously unnoticed aspect of the challenge for TI. This argument is refuted 
in two basic ways: (i) it is noted that the Maudlin experiment cannot be meaningfully recast with 
absorbers described by quantum states; instead the author replaces it with an ordinary which-way 
experiment; and (ii) the extant rebuttals to the Maudlin challenge in its original form are not in 
fact subject to the alleged flaws that Lewis ascribes to them. This paper further seeks to clarify 
the issues raised in Lewis’ presentation concerning the distinction between quantum systems and 
macroscopic objects in TI. It is noted that the latest, possibilist version of TI (PTI) has no 
ambiguity concerning macroscopic absorbers.  In particular, macroscopic objects are not subject 
to indeterminate trajectories, since they are continually undergoing collapse. It is concluded that 
the Maudlin challenge poses no significant problem for the transactional interpretation. 
 
 
Highlights: 
• Lewis’ claim that Maudlin experiment remains unresolved is shown to be incorrect. 
• Antiparticle offer waves are not absorbers for particle offer waves as claimed. 
• Lewis’ alternative experiments are ordinary which-way experiments with additional 
quanta. 
• Macroscopic absorbers are well-defined in PTI and do not have indefinite trajectories. 
• Probabilities of incipient transactions correspond to the quanta transferred, not to 
detectors. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
 
 In Lewis (2013), the author argues that the consistency of the Transactional Interpretation 
of quantum mechanics (TI) continues to face a significant threat from Maudlin’s contingent 
absorber experiment (2002). The author’s discussion unfortunately contains quite a few errors 
and misconceptions. This paper will attempt to clarify some of these issues and to point out that 
the perception of a problem arises from apparent misunderstandings about TI, especially of its 
recent development in Kastner (2012a,b) in its ‘possibilist’ and fully relativistic variant, 
designated as PTI.  In particular, the author’s arguments do not take account of the current status 
of TI as an interpretation that now has clearly defined criteria for what kinds of systems can be 
considered absorbers and what kinds can be considered offer waves described by quantum states.  
 It should first be noted that PTI makes no formal revisions to TI, except to extend it into 
the relativistic domain. Therefore, TI in its original form (Cramer 1986) and PTI both survive the 
Maudlin challenge. The difference between the original TI and the newer PTI is one of ontology 
and range: PTI explicitly treats offer waves as pre-spacetime entities, and it includes relativistic 
interactions as a foundation of the basic transactional process. In particular, the relativistic 
development in PTI provides for a non-arbitrary definition of absorbers as macroscopic objects 
that return confirmations with certainty in response to an offer wave. While the possibilist 
ontology is not crucial for this relativistic extension, it does resolve certain conceptual 
challenges, such as how to understand the multidimensional nature of multi-particle offer waves. 
Thus, this paper defends both the original TI and PTI, although it is the view of this author that 
the possibilist ontology is the more conceptually coherent and fruitful approach. 
 
 I will now briefly review the Maudlin challenge. Figure 1 illustrates the basic setup of 
this thought experiment.  
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Figure 1: The Maudlin Experiment 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, a source emits massive (and therefore, Maudlin assumes, slow-
moving) particles either to the left or right, in the state  [ ]LR +=Ψ
2
1
, a superposition of  
‘rightward’ and ‘leftward’ -propagating states. Offer wave components corresponding to right 
and left are emitted in both directions, but, in Maudlin’s arrangement, only detector A can 
initially return a confirmation wave (since B is blocked by A). If the particle is not detected at A 
(meaning that the rightward transaction failed), a light signal is immediately sent to detector B, 
causing it to swing quickly around to intercept the particle on the left.  B then is able to return a 
confirmation wave of amplitude 
2
1
. At this point, the particle is certain to be detected there, so 
Maudlin claims that the confirmation wave’s amplitude of less than unity is evidence of 
inconsistency on the part of TI. Another aspect of the alleged inconsistency is the appearance of 
causal loops: when B returns a confirmation, the emitter receives it at the time of emission, so 
this seems to imply that B is predetermined to swing to the left. On the other hand, when B does 
not return a confirmation, the emitter has only a right-hand confirmation at the time of emission, 
so that seems to imply that B is predetermined not to swing to the left.  
 Maudlin’s inconsistency claim has been rebutted by Kastner (2006, 2012b, Chapter 5) 
and Marchildon (2006) and Boisvert and Marchildon (2013).  Lewis takes issue with these 
rebuttals, and argues that the only ‘straightforward’ way to resolve the challenge is to treat the 
absorbers as quantum systems. However, this approach fails to establish the author’s claims; 
specific reasons will be discussed below.  In addition, as noted above, TI has recently been 
developed and elaborated by this author into a fully relativistic interpretation with a possibilist 
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ontology (Kastner (2012a,b, 2014)). This development includes specific physical criteria for 
macroscopic absorbers, the kind featured in the Maudlin experiment. Much of the author’s 
discussion does not take into account these developments. This leads to a misapplication of the 
transactional picture, in particular the assignment of offer waves (quantum states) to macroscopic 
objects that are not offer waves. In addition, the author characterizes the treatment of 
macroscopic objects in TI as ‘murky,’ while in fact this issue has been disambiguated in Kastner 
(2012b, Chapters 6 and 7). In view of apparent ongoing confusion surrounding these issues, I 
will attempt to clarify that treatment of macroscopic objects here, with further details in Section 
3.  
 
 In PTI, macroscopic emitters and absorbers are unambiguously defined in terms of their 
constituent microscopic field currents, which are capable of coupling to other fields. This 
coupling is characterized by an amplitude, the coupling amplitude, which is the amplitude for 
emission or absorption of another field, as in the emission of a photon by an electron. The value 
of the coupling amplitude for electrons and photons is the square root of the fine structure 
constant of quantum electrodynamics (the charge of the electron in natural units). A macroscopic 
emitter is a system composed of large enough numbers of microscopic emitting currents (e.g. 
excited electrons) such that the probability of emission of an offer by at least one of the 
microscopic currents constituting the object is virtually unity.1 The same definition holds for 
absorption: a macroscopic absorber, such as a detector in an experiment, is a system composed 
of large enough numbers of microscopic absorbing currents (e.g. ground state electrons) such 
that the probability of generation of a confirmation by at least one of the currents is virtually 
unity. This is discussed in detail in Kastner (2012a, §5), including a representative computation 
of the probability of generation of a confirmation by at least one of the constituent microscopic 
currents in a macroscopic sample, showing that it rapidly approaches unity as the number of 
constituent absorbing currents approaches macroscopic proportions.  
 The preceding sort of system is the only kind of absorber that instantiates the Maudlin 
contingent absorber experiment. An absorber cannot be represented by an offer wave undergoing 
                                                 
1 The coupling amplitude leads to a probability when it is taken into account that every amplitude for emission is 
always accompanied by an amplitude for absorption, and vice versa (no emission or absorption occurs 
independently in the direct-action picture). This gives us two factors of the coupling amplitude. In fact, in the direct-
action picture, this is the natural origin of the QED fine structure constant α, which is the square of the coupling 
amplitude. 
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unitary evolution, because the (closer) absorber A in the Maudlin experiment always generates a 
confirmation and accompanying non-unitary collapse with a specific empirical measurement 
result, upon which the movement of the more distant absorber (B) is contingent. That is what 
makes it a contingent absorber experiment.  
 
2. Lewis alternative experiments are not contingent absorber experiments 
 
 As noted above, much of the author’s discussion concerns an alleged ambiguity of the 
applicability of the transactional picture to macroscopic objects. This issue he identifies as a 
second ‘unnoticed’ aspect of the Maudlin challenge (the first being the alleged inconsistency of 
the probability for detection at absorber B). However, PTI is unambiguous about what counts as 
a macroscopic absorber (and is decidedly not an offer wave) and what counts as a microscopic 
object (which could be described by an offer wave or at least as a bound state describable to a 
good approximation by a quantum state). Perhaps due to a misunderstanding of this work, the 
author presents two ‘alternative’ versions of the Maudlin experiment that misapply the 
transactional picture. In one of these, a quantum system, an antiparticle, is mis-identified as an 
absorber; while in the other, allegedly macroscopic absorbers are assumed to be describable as 
offer waves. Rather than elucidate an ‘overlooked’ aspect of the Maudlin challenge as the author 
claims, these scenarios unfortunately create confusion both about the Maudlin experiment and 
about TI.  
 Specifically, in eqs . (1) and (2) the author proposes an antiparticle offer wave as an 
absorber for a particle offer wave. (I assume that examples of the proposed particles would be an 
electron and a positron.)  However, an antiparticle offer wave cannot be an absorber for a particle 
offer wave. An offer wave of a given field, such as the Fermi-Dirac field for fermions, does not 
couple to other offer waves of the same field, and therefore does not constitute an absorber for 
offer waves of the same field. Of course, a fermion offer wave may be indirectly detected by 
another fermion, for example in the case of a bound electron being excited by another 
approaching electron due to the transactional exchange of a photon. But this possibility at the 
micro-level does not allow the antiparticle in this experiment to be viewed even as an effective 
absorber, since it is participating in unitary evolution (this is discussed further below). 
 In addition, it is not the case that a confirmation wave is sent “from the point at which the 
particle and antiparticle annihilate” (Lewis 2013, discussion under eqn. (2)). A confirmation 
6 
 
wave is always generated by a specific entity, and again the antiparticle is not an absorber for the 
particle. Ordinary relativistic quantum theory treats the interaction between the particle and 
antiparticle offer waves as a scattering process, as does TI, especially in this author’s updated 
version (Kastner 2012b, §6.3). A process in which an incoming particle and antiparticle offer 
undergo scattering has a well-defined amplitude (less than unity) for annihilation, in which the 
outgoing states are two photons. Even if we ignore that and pretend that the amplitude for 
annihilation is unity for each path, there is certainly no confirmation sent from that interaction 
stage.  Those outgoing photons are just offer waves. The only information one has concerning 
‘which way’ both particles went is by way of photon confirmations sent from fixed, macroscopic 
photon detectors that the author doesn’t include in the experiment.  
 But, as alluded to above, the more important point is that the antiparticle offer wave is 
part of a composite particle/antiparticle offer wave with an overall amplitude of 1/√2 for both 
paths. This dictates that the probability for confirmation to be sent from a putative absorbing 
antiparticle that is itself described by either term (even if it could) would be (at most) only ½. In 
contrast, in a contingent absorber experiment, a confirmation is certain to be sent from the 
relevant detector, which generates confirmations with a probability of unity. The status of the 
macroscopic detector as an object that exists in spacetime with a probability of unity and 
generates confirmations with a probability of unity (in contrast to the antiparticle described by an 
amplitude of  1/√2) is further clarified in the next section. 
 Thus, the author’s proposed experiment fails to capture the crucial contingent absorber 
features of the Maudlin challenge. The antiparticle is not really an absorber, and the absorbers 
actually generating the confirmations with certainty for each term of the superposition are fixed. 
The antiparticle, as a unitarily evolving quantum system, becomes correlated with an offer wave 
in a superposition of two ways and thereby acts as a microscopic pointer. But that pointer does 
not yield collapse, which is the hallmark of absorption; instead it must be collapsed by another 
absorber that will generate confirmation with certainty (i.e., a macroscopic absorber). So we end 
up with an ordinary ‘which way’ experiment, in which we are just measuring which way both 
particles went. However, the author’s argument does show that if the Maudlin experiment cannot 
actually be carried out with a truly macroscopic absorber, i.e., one that always generates 
confirmations with certainty, then it poses no challenge whatsoever for TI. 
 We see therefore that the translation of the Maudlin challenge into a ‘quantum 
mechanical’ form makes it vacuous, rather than offering a ‘straightforward solution’ to the 
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problem as the author contends.  Of course, there is no challenge, and the situation is perfectly 
describable in TI, but this is not a contingent absorber experiment; it is just a which-way 
experiment with an extra particle along ‘for the ride’. Nor does this argument demonstrate that 
nullifying the experiment is the only way to resolve the puzzle presented by the experiment in its 
non-nullified, original form. That is, Lewis’ claim that the only way to present an ‘adequate 
realist account’ of the Maudlin experiment is to describe absorbers by quantum states is false, as 
will be shown in §4 and §5. The same basic point applies to the second alternative version in 
which quantum states representing offer waves are erroneously assigned to macroscopic 
absorbers. This second version will be discussed further below. 
 
3. Macroscopic objects well-defined in PTI 
 
 It has been objected in the past that a ‘macroscopic object’ is an allegedly ill-defined or 
problematic concept in TI. While this may once have been the case, it is long past the time that 
this criticism was a fair one. The concept of an absorber as a macroscopic object is discussed in 
detail in Kastner (2012a, section 5). As noted above, absorbers are defined in terms of coupling 
amplitudes, which are naturally interpreted in a direct-action theory (such as the Wheeler-
Feynman (1945, 1949) and Davies (1971, 1972) theories upon which TI is based) as the 
amplitudes for both the emission of offer waves and the generation of confirmations.2 A 
macroscopic absorber, such as Maudlin’s detectors A and B, is a system in which the probability 
for the generation of a confirmation by at least any one of its constituent coupling microscopic 
currents approaches unity. A macroscopic absorber is virtually guaranteed to generate a 
confirmation due to its composition by large numbers of microscopic currents capable of 
coupling to a given offer wave. Similarly, a macroscopic emitter (such as a laser) is virtually 
guaranteed to generate offer waves.  
 Upon the actualization of a transaction, both the emitter and the absorber are localized 
and are therefore macroscopic, spacetime events. Therefore, such an object is never accurately 
described by a quantum state (offer wave), since it is continually being localized due to ongoing 
emission or absorption, and collapse. In contrast, offer waves are nonlocal objects, since they are 
                                                 
2 Feynman himself noted that the coupling amplitude for QED is the amplitude for a real photon to be emitted or 
absorbed (Feynman 1985). In a direct-action picture such as that of Wheeler-Feynman (1945, 1949)  or Davies 
(1971, 1972), upon which TI is based, this is the amplitude for emission of an offer wave or for generation of a 
confirmation wave. 
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field excitations.3 This is how PTI naturally demonstrates the emergence of a classical, 
macroscopic realm from a domain of quantum possibilities. While the account of the emergence 
of a macroscopic absorber is not deterministic, it is quantitatively defined, unambiguous, and 
wholly realist. Since it is the macroscopic, collapsing kind of absorber that creates the Maudlin 
challenge in the first place, the situation discussed in equations (4) and (5) in which macroscopic 
absorbers are erroneously described by offer waves, fails both as a version of Maudlin’s 
challenge and as an application of TI. 
 The author unfortunately creates further confusion about TI’s treatment of macroscopic 
objects in the following statement: “The worry about incorporating macroscopic objects into a 
TI-style analysis is that it opens the door for macroscopic objects to have indeterminate 
trajectories.”  For one thing, it is not clear what the author means by “TI-style.”  If by this he 
means the transactional interpretation in its up-to-date form (Kastner 2012a,b), there is in fact no 
such worry, and to suggest that there is misrepresents the interpretation. If, on the other hand, the 
author has in mind another version of TI with worries not applicable to the version in Kastner 
(2012a,b), he needs to make that clear in order to avoid unnecessary confusion. 
 In any case, the alleged worry about macroscopic objects does not apply to TI in its latest 
form. As discussed in Kastner (2013a,b), it is never appropriate to describe macroscopic systems 
– by which we mean systems composed of enough microscopic currents to generate either offers 
or confirmations with certainty -- by quantum states.  This is because quantum states only apply 
to systems that are either excited states of fields (offer waves) or quantum bound states with very 
small amplitudes (i.e. of the order of the fine structure constant) of emitting offers or generating 
confirmations. In contrast, as noted above, macroscopic objects are always localized by ongoing 
actualized transactions. That is how the existence of macroscopic objects is explained in PTI – 
they are continually undergoing collapse that localizes them in spacetime, so they can’t have 
indeterminate spacetime trajectories.4   
                                                 
3 This may seem to indicate a ‘preferred observable’ in that conserved quantities such as energy and momentum are 
actualized and transferred in transactions. This is a natural reflection of the fact that position is not an observable in 
relativistic quantum theory, which is the more accurate theory. Nonrelativistic quantum theory, which treats position 
as an observable, is only an approximation, and should never be viewed as a free-standing theory. It is through 
actualized transactions that objects become localized – spacetime is just the arena of actualized transactions, and 
spacetime events are actualized emission and absorption events. We never really ‘observe’ position. We simply 
participate in transactions that transfer conserved physical quantities between our sense organs and other objects. 
4 One can assign an ‘effective quantum state’ to a macroscopic object, but only as a kind of correspondence 
principle, e.g., by ascribing to it a center-of-mass position state with so little uncertainty that it can be regarded as 
having a determinate position. However, in general, macroscopic objects are conglomerates of actualized 
transactions, and therefore are not quantum objects. In any case, such a system is certainly not an offer wave. 
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 Thus, neither the antiparticle nor the putative ‘quantum absorbers’ function as real  
absorbers  in the author’s proposed alternative version of the Maudlin experiment. An ‘absorber’ 
in TI is an object that generates confirmations with certainty, and that always results in collapse,  
a nonunitary process. However, the author’s revision of the experiment with quantum states for 
the detectors A and B describes the entire process as unitary; thus the ‘absorbers’ are not really 
absorbers. The whole point of the Maudlin challenge is as a contingent absorber experiment; 
absorber B is made accessible to the left-hand offer wave contingent on the failure of the 
transaction with A. But in the author’s versions, the generation of a confirmation wave is not 
contingent on anything, since all the relevant detectors are available to the offer waves at all 
times. These are the photon detectors overlooked in the author’s first version, and unspecified 
other fixed detectors bringing about the ‘destruction’ of the particles putatively comprising the 
detectors A and B in his second version. The alternative experiments are just ordinary which-
way experiments involving additional quantum systems that could go either way along with 
original particle. So the author fails to construct a ‘quantum’ version of the Maudlin experiment, 
and his arguments based on that premise fail as well.  
 
4. Criticism of Marchildon rebuttal fails 
 
 The author claims that the only ‘straightforward’ solution to the Maudlin experiment is 
by essentially treating all the objects as offer waves – which means, in view of our arguments 
above, to nullify the Maudlin experiment by changing it into an ordinary which-way experiment. 
Does this mean that the rebuttals of Kastner and Marchildon fail to resolve the challenge? No, 
because those rebuttals have apparently been misunderstood.  
 Marchildon’s solution (2006) is elaborated in Boisvert and Marchildon (2013). To 
review, Marchildon notes that in the original conception of the Wheeler-Feynman direct-action 
theory, there is always absorption somewhere for any emitted offer wave; the universe is a ‘light-
tight box’. 5  Thus Marchildon includes a remote, background absorber C, which always returns 
confirmations from the left side. (The left side is where the closer, moveable absorber B moves if 
the right-hand detector A does not fire.) This means that there are always confirmations from 
both the left and the right, and there are always two incipient transactions with probabilistic 
                                                 
5 Recall that the Wheeler-Feynman (1945, 1949) and Davies (1971, 1972) theories of the direct-action picture, upon 
which TI is based, are empirically equivalent to standard theories of fields if the universe is a ‘light-tight box’ or if 
other equivalent boundary conditions obtain -- an alternative BC is explored in Cramer (1983). 
10 
 
weights of ½, correctly reflecting the observed frequencies of detection on the right and the left. 
When detector A does not fire, it means that the particle is emitted to the left and is intercepted 
by B. The author presents Marchildon’s solution and comments: 
 
“Marchildon's account retains the inconsistency …. regarding absorber B; absorber B definitely receives 
the particle if it has a probability of 1/2 of doing so. Furthermore, his account adds a new inconsistency 
regarding absorber C; absorber C definitely does not receive the particle when it has a probability of 1/2 
of doing so. The contradiction at the heart of Maudlin's challenge remains.” (Lewis 2013) 
 
 No, the alleged contradiction does not remain. The mistake in the above argument is in 
ascribing the probabilities to detectors. The probabilities apply to the realization of the properties 
of the quantum being transferred, not to a particular detector. This is so because it is the 
confirmed field itself, not emitters or absorbers, which instantiates the physical probabilities. So 
for example, the particle offer wave component that reaches C is characterized by a particular 
energy and momentum. It does not matter whether that actualized particle is ultimately absorbed 
by the movable detector B or at C; it is the energy and momentum of the particle that is 
actualized, not ‘detection at B’ or ‘detection at C.’ Regardless of which detector ends up 
receiving the energy, the same particle, with the same energy and momentum, is detected. And it 
is detected (actualized) on the left with a probability of ½, meaning that half the time a particle 
with leftward momentum is actualized and half the time a particle with rightward momentum is 
actualized. Thus, there is no inconsistency.  
 The mistake in the author’s argument is in attributing probabilities to specific detectors, 
rather than to the entities actually described by the probabilities – the quanta being emitted and 
absorbed. This misconception is understandable, since standard applications of quantum theory 
routinely attribute the probabilities to detection sites for pragmatic purposes. But the 
probabilities themselves actually apply to the transfer of the physically conserved quantities 
described by the quantum states (energy, momentum, angular momentum, etc.)  So clearly, 
including a distant absorber resolves any apparent inconsistency concerning the physical 
meaning of the weights of the incipient transactions, which function as probabilities of 
actualization of those transactions. Whenever the rightward transaction is not actualized, the 
leftward one is, and they both have a probability of ½, and those are expressed in the observed 
frequencies of the respective outcomes.  
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5. Criticism of Kastner rebuttal fails 
 
 It is clear from the above that Marchildon’s solution is a very straightforward one. 
However, it does depend explicitly on the ‘light tight box’ condition. In an effort to address the 
Maudlin challenge on its own terms (i.e., incomplete absorption) 6, I have pointed out (Kastner 
2012b, Chapter 5) that even in this case, Maudlin’s experiment presents no more inconsistency 
problem for TI than Wheeler’s ‘delayed choice experiment’7 does for standard quantum theory, 
provided one ascribes a particular type of behavior to the photon based on the experimental 
configuration.  In fact this is commonly done in the literature. For example, Peruzzo et al (2012), 
present their interesting variation on the delayed choice experiment and note that the delayed 
choice determines whether the photon will previously have demonstrated wavelike or particle-
like behavior. In this context, ‘wavelike’ means both-routes travel, while ‘particle-like’ means 
which-route travel. Indeed, Peruzzo et al take their experiment to be measuring this behavior on 
the part of the photon (cf. their discussion under eqn. (1)). 
 Regarding Wheeler’s own ontological interpretation of the delayed choice experiment, he 
first comments that : “…one decides whether the photon ‘shall have come by one route or by 
both routes’ after it has already done its travel.” (Wheeler 1981, p. 183). But then he qualifies 
that formulation by saying that “In actuality it is wrong to talk of the route of the photon,”  
because (in Copenhagen fashion) he believes that one cannot speak about what happens apart 
from ‘registered phenomena.’ Nevertheless, Wheeler asserts that the delayed choice ‘reaches into 
the past’ to dictate what the overall phenomenon will be.  
 Now, if one is allowed to consider the photon as engaging in some definite kind of 
behavior (either wave or particle), then a Maudlin-type inconsistency arises for the delayed 
choice experiment, including apparent causal loops (this point is reviewed below). On the other 
hand, if Wheeler’s comments about ‘reaching into the past’ are intended to assert that the past is 
indeterminate prior to the delayed choice, in a kind of growing universe picture,  then there is no 
issue with causal loops nor any inconsistency with the probabilities. Indeed, the indeterminate 
past is part of the PTI ‘growing universe’ picture (Kastner 2012, Chapter 8) , so that also 
                                                 
6 Since direct-action theories require full absorption, or an equivalent boundary condition (such as a perfectly 
reflecting t=0 condition) for empirical equivalence with standard theories of radiation, any scenario lacking full 
absorption is speculative, and responses to the Maudlin challenge on those terms necessarily inherit that speculative 
quality.  
7 Wheeler reviews this proposal in Wheeler (1981). 
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removes the alleged inconsistency facing the transactional picture in connection with the 
Maudlin experiment. 
 To review these points, let us first consider the case in which we can consider the photon 
to be following either a ‘which way’ (particlelike) route or a ‘both ways’(wavelike) route.  The 
causal loop consists in the fact that the choice of an experimenter, at a time t2  whether to do a 
‘which way’ or ‘both ways’ measurement exerts some causal influence on the past of a photon at 
a time t1<t2;  that is,  it affects whether the photon  previously ‘went through both slits’ or ‘went 
through only one slit’. In the usual block world formulation, the future choice at t2 must therefore 
already be determined according to what the photon does at the slits at t1. This gives rise to an 
apparent causal loop of the same kind as the Maudlin challenge: given whatever the photon does 
at t1, the experimenter must choose the corresponding measurement at t2.  If one replaces the 
experimenter’s choice by a quantum coin flip with probabilities of ½ for each option, then the 
probabilities applying to the quantum coin flip are inconsistent.   
 To see this, suppose ‘heads’ instructs us to ‘measure which slit’ and ‘tails’ instructs us to 
‘measure both slits and get interference.’ Each time the coin flips (according to the block world 
picture), its outcome must already be decided by whatever the photon did before the coin flip. If 
the photon went through both slits (i.e., exhibited wavelike behavior), then it is certain that the 
coin will come up ‘tails,’ yet the quantum probability for that outcome is only ½. This is exactly 
the same alleged inconsistency that the Maudlin experiment presents for TI. To the extent that 
the consistency problem can be deflected by Wheeler’s argument that “it is wrong to think of the 
past as ‘already existing’ in all detail,” (Wheeler 1981, p. 194), so can the consistency challenge 
of the Maudlin experiment be deflected in PTI, since according to PTI past events also do not 
exist determinately in spacetime unless they are brought about in actualized transactions. 
 Thus the argument in Kastner (2012b, Chapter 5) points out that most formulations of the 
delayed choice experiment involve at least a tacit assumption that the photon either ‘went by 
both routes’ or ‘went by one or the other route’, and that these are therefore presented with the 
same alleged consistency problems as the Maudlin experiment seems to present for TI.  
However, this is not viewed as a severe problem in the literature (indeed, it does not even seem 
to have been noticed); and therefore the elimination of an untenable double standard dictates that 
it cannot be a severe problem for TI either. Lewis’ response is to note that standard quantum 
theory has unresolved conceptual problems, such as the measurement problem, and argues that it 
should not be considered reassuring to be told that TI is no more threatened by the Maudlin 
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challenge than standard quantum theory is by the delayed choice experiment (where standard 
quantum theory is interpreted as allowing ‘which path’ or ‘both paths’ talk).  In this regard, the 
author cites other interpretations not subject to the Maudlin challenge that he claims solve the 
measurement problem. 8  But in fact it is far from settled that the other approaches cited by the 
author really do solve the measurement problem or satisfactorily explain the Born Rule. 
Meanwhile, I have argued (Kastner 2012, Chapter 3) that the transactional picture readily 
accomplishes both.  
 In any case, the point of the rebuttal reviewed above was to illuminate an apparent double 
standard lurking in judgments that the Maudlin challenge is fatal for TI. Rather than eliminate 
the double standard by acknowledging that in fact neither apparent problem is a severe one for 
standard quantum theory or for TI, the author attempts to minimize the double standard by 
arguing that both apparent problems are severe. Specifically, in arguing that the delayed choice 
experiment presents a severe problem for standard quantum theory, the author claims that this 
was a motivation for John Cramer in developing TI, and invokes Cramer’s discussion (1986, p. 
671) of that experiment. But this is misleading. In the cited section, Cramer was discussing how 
TI can provide an observer-free account of measurement, and pointing out that including the 
response of absorbers resolves the alleged involvement of a conscious observer in determining 
whether a photon retroactively went through one or both slits in the delayed choice experiment. 
Thus, clearly Cramer’s intent was to eliminate the conscious observer and to solve the 
measurement problem in physical terms, not to claim that the delayed choice experiment 
specifically posed a severe consistency problem for quantum theory.  
                                                 
8 The other interpretations claimed by the author to solve the measurement problem are the Bohmian theory, 
Everettian (MWI) approaches, and the GRW theory. However, all these interpretations suffer from serious 
deficiencies not faced by TI, such as difficulty explaining the Born Rule, or what causes the frankly ad hoc 
‘collapses’ of the GRW approach. (Also, the status of GRW approaches as comprehensive interpretations capable of 
dealing with both nonrelativistic and relativistic realms is far from clear, and their alleged ‘resolution’ of the 
measurement problem is bought at the high price of changing quantum theory.) It is not even clear that the Bohmian 
theory does solve the measurement problem (see, e.g., Brown and Wallace 2005), so the author cannot take this for 
granted. In addition there is great difficulty in extending the Bohmian theory to the relativistic domain, while TI 
applies seamlessly to both the nonrelativistic and relativistic domains as shown in Kastner (2012a,b, 2014). 
Regarding MWI, Kent (1990) argues that “no plausible set of axioms exists for an MWI that describes known 
physics.” He extends his critique in a more recent publication (2010), concluding that  “…no known version of the 
theory (unadorned by extra ad hoc postulates) can account for the appearance of probabilities and explain why the 
theory it was meant to replace, Copenhagen quantum theory, appears to be confirmed, or more generally why our 
evolutionary history appears to be Born-rule typical” (Kent 2010) So it is far from established that the alternative 
interpretations cited by the author succeed in resolving the measurement problem or other challenges in 
understanding quantum theory. 
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 Apart from this apparent misstatement by the author of Cramer’s intent regarding the 
delayed choice experiment, the basic point is that if one views aspects of the past as 
indeterminate prior to the delayed choice, which then ‘reaches back into the past’ to bring about 
a determinate situation,  the apparent inconsistency is removed. This remedy applies just as well 
to the possible confirmation wave from B in the context of the Maudlin experiment. So there is 
no need to attempt to remedy the double standard in the negative way chosen by the author; i.e., 
by arguing both (1) that the delayed choice experiment poses a serious consistency threat to 
quantum theory and (2) that the Maudlin challenge poses a serious consistency threat to TI. In 
fact, neither is the case. 
 A further significant inaccuracy in the author’s discussion of Cramer (1986) needs to be 
noted here. Specifically, he claims that TI can be viewed as similar to the Copenhagen 
Interpretation (CI). However, these two interpretations – TI and CI -- could scarcely be more 
different. Cramer (1986) takes great pains to contrast TI with CI, and presents TI as a more 
effective, realist approach which clearly defines the measurement process rather than taking 
macroscopic objects as primitive and relying on the intentions and behaviors of conscious 
observers to define measurement, as in CI. Even if the original TI appears to have taken 
absorbers as primitive (which is debatable) and thereby to invite comparison with CI in terms of 
the macroscopic/microscopic divide, that is certainly no longer the case with the updated 
versions of TI in the literature (Kastner 2012a,b) . That work presents clear physical, observer-
free criteria for the macroscopic/microscopic boundary in the transactional picture.  In view of 
the explicit opposition to CI in Cramer’s original 1986 proposal, and recent developments of TI, 
all of which are clearly aimed at providing a specific physical account of collapse as opposed to 
CI’s appeal to observers in a primitively classical world, this author finds it hard to understand 
how TI could be reasonably considered to have anything of significance in common with the 
Copenhagen interpretation.  
  
6. Conclusion: Maudlin challenge has been decisively refuted 
 
 It has been shown herein that Lewis’ arguments fail to show that the Maudlin experiment 
presents an ongoing significant problem for the transactional picture, either in its original from 
(TI) or its recently developed form (PTI). In several instances the author’s arguments 
mischaracterize and/or misapply the transactional picture, and his alternative versions of the 
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Maudlin experiment are not contingent absorber experiments. All they do is to nullify the 
experiment rather than render it resolvable through a ‘straightforward solution’ as claimed. In 
fact, the simplest and most straightforward solution is that of Marchildon (2006):  in the direct-
action theory upon which TI is based, there is a fully absorbing background universe or 
alternative boundary condition (cf. Cramer 1983) that results in a full set of confirmation waves 
at the emitter. In this case, there are two well-defined incipient transactions with equal weights, 
and those correspond to probabilities expressed in the frequencies of the actualizations of 
leftward- and rightward-directed particles. The probabilities do not apply to specific detectors, 
but rather the particles themselves, which are the entities described by the weights of the 
incipient transactions (as opposed to the detectors B and C).  
 Alternatively, if one wants a more general (but necessarily speculative) approach that 
does not assume complete absorption, one can opt for the observation in Kastner (2012b, Chapter 
5) that in a growing universe the past may be indeterminate without any inconsistency. 
Moreover, Wheeler’s delayed choice experiment gives rise to a similar apparent inconsistency of 
probabilities in a ‘block world’ picture in which one assumes either wavelike or particle-like 
behavior for the unobserved photon while it is in the apparatus. These are no more than 
interesting puzzles for standard quantum mechanics, not fatal problems (to the extent that they 
have even been noticed). Thus there is a double standard involved in treating the Maudlin 
challenge (in its original but speculative incomplete absorber context) as a serious problem for 
TI. 
 In addition, an attempt has been made herein to clarify issues that have been subject to 
apparent confusion, especially the treatment of macroscopic objects in the latest version of the 
transactional picture (PTI). Macroscopic emitters and absorbers are unambiguously defined in 
PTI. These objects cannot accurately be described by quantum states, since they are neither 
excited field states nor quantum bound states. Rather, they are conglomerates of ongoing 
actualized transactions, which physically (not epistemically) localize them as classical, persistent 
spacetime events. Thus such objects cannot have indeterminate trajectories as suggested by the 
author, nor can they be accurately described as offer waves.  In addition, extant rebuttals of the 
Maudlin challenge by Marchildon and Kastner have been shown to be effective when correctly 
understood. Thus Maudlin’s challenge has been effectively disarmed, and no longer presents a 
significant problem for the transactional interpretation. 
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 Finally, the present author recognizes that some researchers view the transactional picture 
as speculative or controversial. However, it should be kept in mind that even currently 
‘mainstream’ interpretations, such as the Bohmian theory or Everettian (Many-Worlds) 
approaches, are not without significant controversy, and contain speculative elements (as briefly 
reviewed in footnote #7). Moreover, the Bohmian approach was considered marginal for decades 
before it became viewed as mainstream. It is probably safe to say that the task of interpreting 
quantum theory has never been without controversy.  Newer approaches are often initially 
viewed as ‘speculative,’ but that does not mean that they are undeserving of serious 
consideration. Science advances by careful consideration and development of initially 
speculative ideas; some of these may ultimately fail, but many succeed. Boltzmann’s atomic 
hypothesis, considered at the time by Mach to be speculative in the extreme, is certainly an 
example of the latter. 
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